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China’s Regional Forum Diplomacy in the Developing World:  
Socialisation and the ‘Sinosphere’ 
 
Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves* 
London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom; Nanyang Technical 
University, Singapore 
 
Abstract   
 
This article examines Chinese-led regional forums in the developing world where the Chinese 
preponderance of economic power is self-evident, its financial largesse is readily utilised to sustain 
these endeavours, its bureaucracies are empowered to guide the conduct of institutional activities 
and its normative intentions and interests are given fullest expression.   
This assessment of two such Chinese-instigated regional forums in the developing world suggests 
that despite the professed norms on ‘political equality’ and ‘mutual benefit’ and efforts to ensure the 
maintenance of Chinese interests over time, China’s stance is increasingly contested by developing 
country member states. These challenges invariably take the form of struggles over the structuring 
of key administrative organs and the decision making process and as such are reflective of norms, 
interests and expectations held by developing country members.  In other words although China 
holds a preponderance of structural power within these regional forums there is an ongoing process 
of socialisation – driven by developing country member states – aimed at reshaping China’s 
behaviour to bring it more closely in line with the other members’ interests.   
 
China’s contemporary rise to global prominence has been accompanied by a spirited debate on the 
necessity of integrating China into the Western norms which dominate the contemporary 
international system.  The overwhelming emphasis of the scholarly literature on China and 
international institutions, following the lead of institutional theory, has focused on the prospects and 
possibilities of socialisation into prevailing norms and practices within the leading international 
institutions.  The undercurrent of these studies is aimed towards producing an assessment of 
China’s desire to endorse and sustain the Western dominated international order and the degree to 
which it seeks to reform (if not overturn) that order.  Responding to the potentially alarmist 
implications of this debate, the Chinese government has sought to soothe Western concerns through 
employment of a ‘peaceful rise’ discourse and engaging more readily in pro-active multilateralism.1  
In the case of the latter, Beijing’s actions in the UN Security Council around issues of intervention 
have undergone a distinctive shift on questions like Darfur and UN peacekeeping generally, albeit 
one which remains open to criticism as representing an episodic change rather than any sign of a 
systemic embrace of new norms on sovereignty.2 Moreover, the establishment of the G20 has given 
                                               
* Contact: Chris Alden, j.c.alden@lse.ac.uk  
1 See for example, “White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development”, Information Office of the 
State Council of the People's Republic of China, September 6, 2011, accessed June 2, 2016, 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7126562.htm; Zheng Bijian, ‘China’s 
‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status,’ Foreign Affairs 84(5), (2005), pp. 18-24; Bonnie S. Glaser 
and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in China: The Ascension 
and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise’’, The China Quarterly 190, (2007), pp. 291-310. 
2 See Zhao Lei, ‘Two Pillars of China’s Global Peace Engagement Strategy: UN Peacekeeping and 
International Peacebuilding’, International Peacekeeping 18(3), (2011), pp. 344-362; Allen 
Carlson, ‘More Than Just Saying No: China’s Evolving Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention 
since Tiananmen’, Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross eds., New Directions in the Study of 
China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Mathieu Duchâtel, Oliver 
Bräuner,  and Zhou Hang, Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift away from Non-
interference, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 41,  (2014); Chin-Hao Huang, "From Strategic Adjustment to 
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further prominence to China’s critical role in managing the fallout from the 2009 global financial 
crisis as well as quickened the tenor of discussions over Chinese intentions and even role in shaping 
the emerging international architecture. 
 
Curiously, this literature on Chinese socialisation has ignored the raft of Chinese-instigated regional 
initiatives, from the Boao Forum for Asia to the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Forum, all 
of which have been established in the new century.  These initiatives are inevitably constructed 
within the developing world where Beijing surfaces as an alternative to the ‘Washington consensus’ 
by proposing multilateral dialogue platforms within the south. Grounded on a different set of norms 
(non-conditionality, equality, mutual-benefit, non-interference in internal affairs), such regional 
forums in the developing world are supported by competing financial institutions and funds where 
China appears as the main shareholder, namely the China-Africa Development Fund, the $40bn Silk 
Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank . In these China-led initiatives the Chinese 
preponderance of economic power is self-evident, its financial largesse is readily utilised to sustain 
these endeavours, its bureaucracies are empowered to guide the conduct of institutional activities 
and its normative intentions and interests are given fullest expression. Indeed, an examination of 
these regional arrangements reveals the preferred norms, interests and practices that feature in 
contemporary Chinese approaches to multilateralism more clearly than studies of Chinese actions 
within already established international institutions, where Beijing is more likely to conform to 
existing norms.  This is at least as illuminating as the attempts to discern Chinese intentions and 
impact on the international system found in the existing literature on socialisation.  Moreover, the 
creation of a network of regional forums and the growing institutionalisation of these is in keeping 
with a gradualist shift away from Beijing’s firm adherence to the foreign policy principle of non-
alignment to a looser interpretation that allows for a variety of engagements with groupings of 
states. These configurations foster a unique set of regional arrangements for China, providing it 
with opportunities to discuss matters of mutual concern internal to their ties with these states and 
allowing them to collectively consider common policy perspectives on a range of global topics, 
including the revision of global governance institutions. Alongside the recent initiatives such as of 
the establishment of the AIIB and the BRICS New Development Bank, China’s regional forum 
diplomacy can be seen to being laying the foundation for a parallel international order, one in which 
Chinese interests hold sway. 
 
This assessment of two such Chinese-instigated regional forums in the developing world suggests 
that despite the professed norms on ‘political equality’ and ‘mutual benefit’ and efforts to ensure the 
maintenance of Chinese interests over time, China’s stance is increasingly contested by developing 
country member states. These challenges invariably take the form of struggles over the structuring 
of key administrative organs and the decision making process and as such are reflective of norms, 
interests and expectations held by developing country members.  In other words, although China 
holds a preponderance of structural power within these regional forums there is an ongoing process 
of socialisation – driven in this case by developing country member states and expanding over time 
– aimed at reshaping China’s behaviour to bring it more closely in line with the other members’ 
interests.  Understanding this process, the areas of contestation and degree of accommodation and 
resistance by Beijing, provides important insights into the viability of China’s professed role as a 
global leader within the developing world intent on fostering a more equitable international order 
commensurate with its own interests. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Normative Learning? Understanding China's Peacekeeping Efforts in Africa," Journal of 
International Peacekeeping 17(3), (2013), pp 248-271; Chin-Hao Huang, ‘Peacekeeping, 
Sovereignty, and Intervention’ in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Emilian Kavalski (London: Ashgate, 
2012). 
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This article explores the configuration that some of these Chinese regional forums in the developing 
world have taken, specifically the Forum for China-Africa Co-operation founded in 2000 and the 
Macau Forum founded in 2003. It then examines the structures and institutionalised practices 
developed within these particular organisations.  Finally it concludes with an assessment as to the 
insights that they provide into China’s conception of the international system in this period of 
transformation and the possibilities of impact of socialisation derived from non-Western sources.  
 
International Institutions and the Quest to Socialise China 
 
The quest for modernisation initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 triggered China’s gradual 
engagement with international institutions over the following three decades. This signalled a clear 
departure from Mao’s rule marked by suspicion and sharp criticism towards western-dominated 
international governance system. Whilst this reality has done much for the improvement of China’s 
image before the international community, Beijing’s increasing military expenditure3 and economic 
ventures in non-traditional regions, raises concerns about the nature of China’s rise and questions 
the depth of its commitment to the norms and institutions that frame the liberal international order.   
This concern over the degree of China’s ‘socialization’ into dominant normative underpinnings of 
the international system is embedded in most of the international relations literature on China since 
the 1990s.The socialisation debate has been evolving around a key question, whether China is likely 
to accommodate to dominant norms or will it try to shape the international system to its own image, 
which could be condensed in the classic realist dilemma: is China a status quo or a revisionist 
power? 
Iain Johnston concluded in the early 2000s that it was not scientifically sustainable to classify China 
either as a revisionist state or as a status quo power, at least in the traditional sense.4  He argued that 
China had become by then too much integrated in the international community to be seen as a 
revisionist state, not only in terms of international organisations membership (clearly above the 
world’s average and only slightly below U.S., Japanese and Indian records), but also in economic 
liberalism compliance.  
Nonetheless, Johnston pointed out some particularities in China’s behaviour that made it a fragile 
status quo power: its poor record on human rights and the evidence that it was more compliant 
within economic organisations than within security organizations. A sudden surge in revisionist 
behaviour could not be ruled out, particularly considering that China is now a much stronger 
(economic and military) player in the context of a world order in transition. Such assertive conduct 
could be triggered by an internal or external security crisis.  
By stressing the role of the socialization process in changing China’s self-concept and of its role in 
the international community, Johnston effectively endorses a more appeasement oriented approach 
towards China. Evidence from a number of studies looking at China’s interaction with international 
organisations and the mechanism of economic competition5 seems to support this stance. Accession 
to WTO marked a turning point in strengthening the commitment to embrace market reforms and 
was followed by Beijing’s efforts to globalise its newly consolidated state-owned enterprises.  
                                               
3Joshua Shifrinson and Michael Beckley, ‘Debating China’s Rise and US Decline: 
Correspondence’, International Security 13(37:3), (2012), pp. 172-181.  
4 Alistair I. Johnston, ‘Is China a Status quo power?’ International Security 27(4), (2003), pp. 5-56. 
5 Quddus Z. Snyder, ‘The Illiberal Trading State: Liberal systemic theory and the mechanism of 
socialization’, Journal of Peace Research 50(1), (2013), pp. 33-45; Margaret Pearson, ‘The Major 
Multilateral Economic Institutions Engage China’, in Engaging China: the Management of a Rising 
Power, ed. I. A. Johnston et al, (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 207-234; Ann Kent, Beyond 
Compliance: China in International Organizations and Global Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
UP, 2007); Alistair I. Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2008) 
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Moreover, since the late 1990s Beijing has begun to relax its strict adherence to foreign policy 
principles that once defined its position within the international system, namely non-interference 
and non-alignment.  Dogmatic stances have gradually given way to selective participation in 
multilateral activities like UN peacekeeping operations and formal engagement with a variety of 
regional bodies like the ASEAN Forum.  All these trends suggest that China is moving inexorably 
towards conformity of practice and ultimately convergence with the established international order. 
  
Whilst compliant with most international practices at present, China’s leadership, however, is yet to 
conform to a global governance system fully dominated by Western norms. A number of high 
ranking Chinese officials have openly called for reforms of the financial international system in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis.6 As China continues to grow and settles in its new role as a 
leading superpower, it is not inconceivable that Beijing would expect Chinese norms, values, and 
preferences to shape a new Sino-centric world order.   
 
At this point in time, it is thus hard to determine to what degree China has in the course of its 
socialisation internalised the norms, principles and values that sustain the international system 
status quo. The reality seems to be multifaceted. As highlighted by David Shambaugh7, while 
increasingly engaged in international institutions and global issues, China remains highly distrustful 
of a Western dominated international system that it considers unequal and unfair, advocating a 
greater role for developing countries in global governance. Seen from this perspective, Beijing may 
well be complying only for as long as it serves its immediate national interests.  Recent scholarship 
on China’s socialisation seems to corroborate this proposition. In a study comparing Chinese aid in 
three different countries in Southeast Asia, James Reilly8 concludes that while China’s socialisation 
into international aid norms and practices seems to be occurring in contexts where there are strong 
institutions and extensive international aid presence agencies (Cambodia and Vietnam), its conduct 
remains averse to international aid norms and largely self-interested and opaque in countries like 
Myanmar. This suggests that China’s compliance with the extant normative paradigm is more 
driven by external constrains than by actual internalisation of those norms. Gregory Chin9 contends 
that after a long period of socialisation, China is now actively engaged in changing norms and 
practices of World Bank institutions from within.  According to Chin, through a memorandum of 
understanding between the World Bank and the China Exim Bank signed in 2007 Beijing has been 
pushing the institution to accept new operational norms in co-financed loan packages. This new 
development is to a large degree the result of China’s emergence as a co-donor with the World 
Bank and its growing financial clout in developing regions, which combined have positioned 
China’s relationship with the World Bank in a more equal footing. The weakening of western 
leadership and Bretton Woods’ institutions in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has opened a 
window for China to become more assertive in pushing forward its preferred norms and practices in 
recent years. While continuing to selectively internalising global norms, China has started to 
imprint some of its alternative norms to these institutions, a process that Chin calls ‘two-way 
socialisation’.  
 
Building on the above, this article argues that China’s growing thrust to establish dialogue 
platforms with different regions in the developing world (or ‘global south’) since 2000 illustrates a 
                                               
6 Elizabeth Economy, ‘The Game Changer: Coping with Chinese Foreign Policy Revolution’, 
Foreign Affairs 89(6), (2010), pp. 142-152 
7 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013) p. 153 
8James Reilly, ‘A Norm Taker or a Norm Maker? Chinese aid in Southeast Asia’, Journal of 
Contemporary China 21(73), (2012) pp. 71-91. 
9 Gregory Chin, ‘Two-Way Socialization: China, the World Bank, and Hegemonic Weakening’, 
Brown Journal of World Affairs 19(1), (2012), pp. 211-231. 
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parallel dimension in its quest to reshape global governance and the dominant normative paradigm. 
A normative power does not become one by self-declaration, it needs to be recognised as such by 
others, its norms and practices need to be accepted and internalised as the normal standard in 
international life. By strengthening its institutional ties with other developing regions, China is 
hoping to socialise to its norms and practices this part of the world, which due to its discomfort vis 
a vis the dominant neo-liberal order is potentially more permeable to Beijing’s alternative paradigm. 
Emilian Kavalski argues that China’s attempt to become a global normative power is building on 
three key intertwined steps: i) generating locally appropriate interactions (dialogical relationships) 
“(…) that allows for the ongoing reassessment of preferences and expectations between 
participating actors as well as the modification and tweaking of strategies.”10; ii) constructing 
deliberate relations that provide a facilitating environment for learning and socialisation of target 
states; iii) instigating nascent communities of practice.  Notwithstanding these effort, as this article 
argues, the deliberate and continuous practice of interaction with communities of states in the 
developing world does not necessarily ensure success.   
Chinese foreign policy is tactical and pragmatic, evolving in response to changing circumstances.  
But scholars like Glaser and Medeiros argue that over the longer term, China’s strategic goals 
remain essentially unchanged, i.e. to re-establish China’s premier standing within the regional and 
international order. This includes replacing US strategic primacy in East Asia, something that 
regional leaders like Lee Kwan Yew regard it as ‘natural’ for a great civilization to aspire to be 
restored as the number one power in the world.11  
Martin Jacques puts forward an alternative interpretation not based on the alarmist tenets of realism 
underpinning ‘power transition theory’ but rather is loosely drawn from historical sociology.  
Jacques suggests that because of its origins as a ‘civilizational power’ that pre-dates Western 
modernity and the formation of the contemporary international system, far from seeking conformity 
with the prevailing order, China’s rise will necessarily and fundamentally alter the nature of 
international politics.12 Concepts like tianxia (‘all under heaven’) have been resurrected by Chinese 
and Western scholars to explain the historical conduct of Imperial China in its diplomatic relations 
with its neighbours, a system that was rooted in a hierarchical framework of international relations 
centred around the emperor.13  Though still a minority view, and one that runs counter to thrust of 
current Western policy making towards Beijing, this Sino-centric approach is gaining some 
currency amongst scholars.14  According to Zhang and Buzan, this form of Pax Sinica produced 
consistent discourses at the centre which emphasize societal stratification – with the cultural 
superiority of China asserted – but were characterised by extreme variation and institutional 
                                               
10Emilian Kavalski, ‘The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Normative power Europe 
and Normative power China in context’, Cooperation and Conflict, 48(2), (2013), p. 261. 
11Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy Making in 
China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise’, The China Quarterly, 190 
(2007), pp. 291-310; also see Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand 
Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2012), 
p. 2.  
12 Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World, updated edition, (London: Penguin 2012), pp. 15-
21; 340-341. 
13 Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan,’The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and 
Practice’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 5(1), (2012), pp. 12-16.  They characterise it as 
a ‘hegemonic construction’; 
14 Amongst others, see Zhou Fangyin, ‘Equlibirum Analysis of the Tributary System’, Chinese 
Journal of International Politics 4(2), (2011), pp. 147-178; Yongjin Zhang  and Barry Buzan,’The  
Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice’, Chinese Journal of International 
Politics 5(1), (2012), pp. 3-36 
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weakness in their actual operation.15  The creeping employment of Confucian tenets in framing 
Chinese foreign policy by the leadership adds further credence to the notion of it seeking to present 
itself as a ‘civilizational power’.   
It is in this context that China’s involvement with regional forums needs to be placed. For the last 
decade China has embarked on a series of initiatives aimed at fostering its own unique regional 
arrangements with the developing world. These take the form of a set of ‘forums’ that give 
preference to Chinese interests in the first instance, are supported by Chinese finance and shaped by 
Chinese values, all in all collectively projecting a vision of a veritable Chinese form of 
multilateralism. In examining these regional forum initiatives, it is our contention that one can get a 
clearer understanding of the defining norms and practices which inform Chinese foreign policy 
towards the international system.  Moreover, a comparative study of China’s forum diplomacy 
provides insight into the debate on socialisation in interesting and unexpected ways, as will be made 
apparent in the rest of the article.    
 
China and ‘Forum Diplomacy’ in the Developing World  
 
China’s involvement in regional organisations in the developing world is closely linked to the aim 
of furthering its leadership role in the global south.  The willingness to engage with existing 
regional organisations, started with the expressed desire to meet ASEAN more regularly by Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in 1991, which culminated in China's participation in the ASEAN 
Regional Forum and its formalised acceptance as an ASEAN ‘dialogue partner’ in 1996.  This 
standing was raised further with the setting of a ‘strategic partnership’ with ASEAN in 2003. At the 
dawn of the 21st century Beijing's diplomatic courtship reached out to developing regions further 
afield: Latin America and Africa. In 2004 China joined the Organisation of American States (OAS) 
as a permanent observer.  In that same year the Chinese National People’s Congress signed a 
cooperation agreement with the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) and in January 2009 it 
joined the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) as a donor. This diplomatic courtship to 
Latin America culminated in the recent establishment of a dialogue platform with the Community 
of Latin American and Caribbean States - CELAC (China-CELAC Forum) which first inter-
ministerial meeting was held in January 2015. With respect to the African continent, China has been 
much more assertive in its diplomatic courtship, having created the Forum for China Africa 
Cooperation – FOCAC - in 2000; followed by a gradual revitalisation of its participation in the 
African Development Bank (a member since 1985) and the African Union (permanent Mission in 
2015) whilst building up relations with some African sub-regional organisations. These 
developments in the foreign policy sphere have their parallels in the foreign economic policy arena 
with the establishment of a Free Trade Area with ASEAN in 2010, whilst negotiations are 
underway with Mercosur and the Southern African Customs Union (SADC).  A number of bilateral 
FTAs have been signed with smaller economies in the developing world, namely Chile in 2006, 
Peru in 2010 and Costa Rica in 2011. To this adds the signing of currency swap agreements to settle 
cross border trade with an increasing number of countries in these regions, the generous extension 
of bilateral development financing and even the creation of financial instruments such as the China 
Africa Development Fund (CADF) in 2007 and the more recent multilateral banking institutions 
mentioned above.  
 
Against this backdrop, the question arises as to why Beijing would wish to pursue a policy of 
establishing a unique set of formalised relationships with regional groupings of developing 
countries?  And, in so doing, to engage them not through any of the type of ‘partnership’ 
configurations already in use, but rather by devising its own unique diplomatic apparel, that seems 
to privilege ‘forum diplomacy’?  
                                               
15Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan, ‘The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and 
Practice’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 5(1), (2012), pp. 30-31. 
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In this regard, the set of regional forum arrangements complements prevailing bilateral ties that 
China has alongside with members as well as feeding into Chinese relations with regional and 
international organisations, providing opportunities to discuss matters of mutual concern and 
develop common policy perspectives. Importantly, they do so outside of the direct shadow of 
Western influence – the US and the EU, for instance, are not included as members in the China-
CELAC Forum or the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation. By the same token, they are bodies that 
facilitate discussions of deeper economic involvement and can also serve as a site for devising 
policies and cementing practices that reflect more accurately the interests of the key provider of 
‘public goods’ to the forum, China.  Moreover, as a founding member with the most pronounced 
role in supporting these regional forms (financially and administratively), Chinese values, 
preferences, and interests are bound to feature more readily in structures, internal procedures, norms 
setting, policies and deliberations of these regional forums than in any of the pre-established 
counterparts. Indeed, by selectively expanding these forums further to include institutionalised 
features such as secretariats, development funds  and parallel initiatives such as ‘business forums’ 
and ‘think tank forums’, Beijing is slowly raising their stature and signalling their importance 
within the broader panoply of its other formalised diplomatic relationships within the international 
system, while at the same time creating alternatives to dominant global institutions, particularly in 
the development financing realm.     
 
The creation of its own multilateral platforms reflects China’s aspirations to shape the rules of 
regional cooperation and by doing so foster a predictable behaviour from its counterparts and 
consequently a peaceful external environment that is favourable to domestic growth and the 
expansion of its interests abroad while simultaneously dispelling concerns about China’s rise.16 
Increasingly they offer opportunities to display Chinese particularist approaches to issues of 
importance to developing countries like modalities of modernisation or humanitarian intervention.17 
In short, they become emblematic of Chinese efforts to site and order their foreign relations within a 
structure that reflect their vision of a harmonious global order without the overlay of Western 
influence. 
 
It is important to note that while the creation of this network of regional forums is ascribed in this 
article as being ‘Beijing-instigated’, in fact in a strict sense this has not always been the case. For 
instance, in the case of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, it was inspired by FOCAC and 
apparently accepted with some reluctance by Beijing.18 The debate over the creation of a regional 
forum between Latin American states and China, something that Beijing reportedly sought, took 
place over a number of years before the contours were finally agreed upon.19  However, while there 
might be some debate as to the origins of the idea to create a particular forum, there is no doubt as 
to the centrality of Beijing in the decision to pursue the initiative, to give it institutional meaning 
and provide the requisite financial and diplomatic support to keep it running.    
 
China and Two Case Studies of Regional Forums 
 
The cases chosen are found in the developing regions of the world, with one of them, the FOCAC 
involving the continent of Africa and the second, the Macau Forum, cutting across regional 
                                               
16 Chien-Peng Chung, ‘China's Approaches to the Institutionalization of Regional Multilateralism’, 
Journal of Contemporary China, 17(57), (2008), p. 748 
17 Suisheng Zhao, ‘The China Model – can it replace the Western Model of modernization?’ 
Journal of Contemporary China, 19(65), (2010), pp. 419-436 
18 Interview with Sudanese diplomat, Shanghai, September 2010. 
19 Interview with senior members of CAF (Latin American Development Bank), June 2013. 
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divisions to embrace Lusophone countries across Africa, Southeast Asia, South America and 
southern Europe. Both regional forums represent the earliest expressions of regional forum 
diplomacy and, as such, have well over a decade of experience that presents significant insights into 
the process, interactions and challenges facing this initiative. 
 
Forum for China-Africa Co-operation 
 
The origins of the FOCAC process are to be found in a variety of converging factors. The economic 
context of China’s ‘going out’ strategy was significant, bringing with it a need for key resources 
which Africa could readily supply. Politically, there was a renewed push to counter Taiwan’s so-
called ‘dollar diplomacy’ on the continent, which had succeeded in winning back official 
recognition from a number of African states by the early 1990s. This corresponded with the broader 
aims of revitalizing diplomatic ties with the developing world in the wake of Tiananmen and the 
accompanying Western opprobrium and sanctions.20   
President Jiang Zemin and Li Peng’s Africa-Asia tours in 1996 and 1997,21 respectively, were a 
prelude for the full revival of Africa in China’s foreign policy that materialized at the dawn of the 
21st century. Responding to calls by African diplomats for a China-Africa diplomatic forum,22 
President Jiang Zemin formally proposed the launching of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC). During the build-up to the event, African ambassadors in Beijing served, along with 
their counterparts in what was initially an ad hoc unit within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, as a de facto secretariat for organising the first FOCAC ministerial meeting.  Held in 
Beijing in 2000, a total of 80 ministers from China and Africa participated along with 
representatives from African regional economic communities and the private sector. The agenda 
was decidedly mixed, with a commitment to increase trade, provisions were made for strengthening 
development co-operation through expansion of Chinese credit facilities, and a commitment to 
monitor and reduce the flow of Chinese small arms, all contained in the final conference 
declaration.23 More general statements in the declaration included support for the ‘one China’ 
policy, the centrality of the UN to global governance and the dangers of ‘hegemony’ for the 
international system, advocacy for an African seat in a reformed UN Security Council and an 
endorsement of the universality of human rights while ascertaining the right of states to pursue their 
own approaches towards this issue. A joint China-Africa Business Council was established. 
The first action plan established a three level follow up mechanism with the aim of providing a 
platform to discuss and assess the Forum’s progress in cooperation. At the top sits the FOCAC 
Inter-ministerial meeting that meets every three years; in between the Senior Officials Meeting 
(SOM) meets twice ahead of FOCAC (1 year before and again a few days before); and at the 
bottom level the Chinese Follow-up Committee is to hold regular meetings with the African 
diplomatic corps (every two to three months). The FOCAC Follow up Committee, which is in 
charge of running daily operations and coordinate follow up actions (the de facto secretariat of 
FOCAC) is led by the African Department at MOFA in close coordination with officials from 
                                               
20 Ian Taylor, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (London: Routledge 2011) pp. 
20-22; 38. 
21When these tours took place not only was the Taiwan issue on the table but also a resolution on 
China’s human rights situation was being voted in the Human Rights Commission. 
22 Ambassador Liu Guijin, SAIIA-RAS pre-FOCAC conference Misty Hills, Muldersdrift, South 
Africa, September 2006; Li Anshan et al, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: from a 
sustainable perspective (Beijing: World Wildlife Fund, 2012), p. 10. 
23Beijing Declaration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing 2000. For two interpretations of the 
Declaration, see Li Anshan et al, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: from a sustainable 
perspective (Beijing: World Wildlife Fund, 2012), p. 31; Ian Taylor, The Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) (London: Routledge 2011), pp. 41-44. 
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MOFCOM and the Ministry of Finance, with no direct participation from African countries. There 
is thus no joint secretariat or other monitoring entity.  
The second FOCAC ministerial meeting took place in December 2003 in Addis Ababa under the 
auspices of the Ethiopian government but within sight of the newly established African Union with 
70 ministers from China and Africa participating along with representatives of the regional 
economic communities and private business.24  Most notable in the declaration was the firm 
commitment to raise two-way trade to US$30 billion by the next FOCAC meeting, the forgiving of 
debt owed by 31 African countries, to support the UN and African regional organisations in their 
efforts to promote peace, and to combat terrorism and ‘hegemony’ in international affairs.25   
It was, however, the third FOCAC summit held in Beijing in November 2006, that attracted world’s 
attention by bringing together the largest number ever of African leaders in a summit outside the 
continent. The final declaration of FOCAC III called for an increase in trade to US$100 billion by 
the next ministerial meeting as well as commitments to reduce tariffs on 440 items produced by 
Africa’s least developed countries, the creation of a US$5 billion China-Africa development fund 
(CAD Fund) and numerous small grant and training programmes.26  It reiterated the ‘one China’ 
policy, the need for reform of UN institutions and China’s commitment to supporting African 
positions in multilateral affairs 
Regarding the process itself, in the build-up to this first FOCAC event the pattern of engagement 
was established with officials from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs developing a preliminary 
agenda for the conference, sharing it with the African ambassadors based in Beijing, who would 
then respond (presumably interacting with their government back home) and, ultimately a shared 
programme would be developed.27 A series of preparatory meetings between Chinese diplomats and 
African officials – and in those instances when African governments were to serve as hosts, 
between Beijing and the African government in question – hammered out the detailed programme 
for the FOCAC and logistical arrangements in the build up to the actual event.  For some African 
officials involved, however, the process has depended too much on Chinese inputs and initiatives in 
setting the agenda.28 Chinese diplomats counter with their continuing concerns as to the fragmented 
African contribution, noting the frequent disconnect between African diplomats in Beijing and 
decision makers in their capitals.29 Irrespective of the joint long term planning involved in FOCAC, 
African officials say that they remain unsure as to Chinese position until the actual opening of the 
summit when formal announcements of commitments to particular policies are made by Chinese 
leaders.30 The public announcement of the FOCAC declaration concludes the ministerial meeting, 
along with the issuing of an action plan.  However, AU officials note that the absence of an 
established monitoring and evaluation mechanism for commitments made with each FOCAC action 
plan has meant that there is no empirical basis upon which to measure whether Chinese assistance 
has met its targets and its impact.31  At this point, AU officials are lobbying Beijing to accept usage 
                                               
24 Li Anshan et al, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: from a sustainable perspective 
(Beijing: World Wildlife Fund, 2012), pp. 33-34. 
25 “Beijing Action Plan-2007-2009”, Forum on China Africa Cooperation, accessed March 10, 
2015, www.focac.org/en/Itda/dscbzjhy/DOC32009/t280369.htm,  
26 Ibidem 
27 Interviews with African ambassadors, Pretoria, January 2012; SAIIA-RAS pre-FOCAC 
conference Misty Hills, Muldersdrift, South Africa, September 2006. 
28 Interview with South African official, Pretoria, May 2014 
29 Interviews with officials from South African Department of Trade and Industry, Pretoria, 28 
November 2007. African ambassadors commentary, SAIIA-RAS pre-FOCAC conference Misty 
Hills, Muldersdrift, South Africa, September 2006. 
30 Interview with South African official, Pretoria, May 2014 
31 Interview with AU officials, Johannesburg, February 2015. 
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of the AU’s monitoring and evaluation instrument based within its New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEPAD) division.    
Linked to these concerns is the persistent desire to formally bring the FOCAC process within the 
AU’s Global Partnerships division, which could function as a permanent secretariat within the 
regional organisation (much as it already does for the AU’s other global partnerships). Preliminary 
discussions between Chinese and African representatives held in the preparations for FOCAC IV 
attempted to involve the AU as both a representative and a potential site for a permanent secretariat.  
Indeed, the Chinese asserted that they supported the inclusion of the AU but talks floundered due to 
disputes amongst African countries, the most significant being the involvement of Morocco (which 
withdrew from the continental body’s predecessor, the Organisation for African Unity, in protest of 
its support for the Polisario).32  However, in the wake of the fourth FOCAC ministerial in Egypt in 
November 2009, one of the key obstacles was overcome. Using a formula derived from the EU-
Africa Summit, whereby Morocco was involved (EU-Africa + Morocco) without challenging the 
respective positions of member states on this dispute seemed to have paved the way for a FOCAC 
permanent secretariat to be housed within the AU by 2012.33 Despite this promising development, 
no significant progress has been made to replace existing arrangements centred on regular meetings 
between the Follow up Committee and the African ambassadors based in Beijing with a secretariat 
located in AU structures nor any concessions to African calls for Beijing to recognise the AU’s 
special status (at the moment it is treated like other African states) within FOCAC.34 Indeed, there is 
much frustration with the fact that, of all the formalised global partnership arrangements (including, 
amongst others, Turkey, India, Korea, Japan, the US and the EU) with the AU, China is the only 
one that does not conduct the relationship through the AU’s executive body, the AU Commission.  
Chinese resistance to this may be linked to costs involved and logistic complexity inherent to 
managing 53 states on the African side; however, according to one senior African diplomat, it is due 
to the fact that ‘they want to maintain control over the process.’35  
The onset of the fifth FOCAC ministerial in Beijing in July 2012 coincided with the surge in trade 
and investment, making China the continent’s leading trade partner and its top investor. With the 
new AU headquarters funded and built by the Chinese in 2012, the stage was set for a new phase of 
more integrated cooperation between China, African states and its leading regional organisation. 
The announcement by outgoing President Hu Jintao of a ‘China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for 
Peace and Security’ formalised the desire to expand China’s involvement in African security, 
working with the AU and in conjunction with the UN Security Council.  Envisaged were financial 
support, personnel exchanges, training of peacekeepers and participation in conflict prevention, 
peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction and development.36 By way of contrast, the sixth 
FOCAC was convened in December 2015 in Johannesburg against the backdrop of a slowing 
Chinese economy and with that, nearly 40% fall in two-way trade and an 84% drop in Chinese FDI 
in 2015.37 Persistent lobbying by South Africa overcame Beijing’s resistance to making the event a 
high-profile summit, and, in response to rising African concerns over the structure of trade (African 
resources for Chinese manufactured goods and increasingly services), commitments were made by 
President Xi Jinping to channel some $10 bn of the $60 bn in credits and grants towards promoting 
                                               
32Interview with Chinese diplomat, Beijing, September 2009. 
33 Interview with South African diplomat, Johannesburg, December 2009. 
34 Interviews with South African diplomats seconded to AU, Pretoria, December 2014. 
35Personal communication with senior African diplomat, Johannesburg, February 2015 
36 “Beijing Declaration of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC ”, July 23, 2012, 
accessed March 15, 2015, http://www.focac.org/eng/dwjbzjjhys/hywj/t954245.htm   
37 “Africa-China exports fall by 40% after China slow down”, BBC News, January 13, 2016, 
accessed May 18, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35303981; Adrienne Klasa, 
“Chinese investment in Africa plunges 84%”, Financial Times, October 21, 2015, accessed May 18, 
2016, www.ft.com/cms/s/3/10648918-773b-11e5-a95a-27d368e1ddf7.html,. 
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industrialization in the continent.38 The Agenda for Action released in the wake of the summit 
mirrored the development plans outlined in the AU’s recently launched Agenda 2063.  
As demonstrated above, as the FOCAC process has developed over the years so has institutional 
and procedural complexity. Alongside FOCAC and the Business Forum held parallel to the main 
event, a number of other sub-forums have surfaced in the wake of FOCAC IV which are held 
months or weeks in advance of the ministerial meeting. These include China-Africa media 
cooperation, China-Africa think tank forum, China-Africa young leaders forum; China-Africa 
people’s forum - all instigated and financially supported by Beijing.    
These initiatives reflect a shift towards moving beyond declarations of common purpose, which 
face growing public dissonance in both China and Africa to actions aimed at promoting shared 
knowledge and most importantly develop a common agenda and set of values. For instance, in 
2012, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched an annual funding competition aimed at 
fostering closer cooperation between Chinese and African researchers. This was reinforced by the 
formal designation by Beijing of 10 Chinese and 10 African think tanks as partners and as preferred 
participants in the China Africa Think Tank Forum (CATTF) that are eligible for this funding 
support.  Behind this knowledge exchange and shared research agendas, is an effort by Chinese 
officials to strengthen the weak research and analytical capacity of its own research bodies on 
African affairs.39 Moreover, the most recent CATTF conference in South Africa in advance of the 
FOCAC VI Summit of 2015 focused on common cultural values aligning Chinese and African 
interests as distinctive and foundational sources of cooperation.40 Whilst fostering mutual 
understanding and common values, these sub-forums have also been increasingly used by Africans 
to voice their expectations and concerns regarding shortcomings in the relationship, including 
affirming support for democracy and frustration with the continuing economic asymmetries in the 
relationship.41     
The Macau Forum 
 
The Macau Forum was established in 2003 to facilitate trade and economic co-operation between 
China and the Portuguese speaking countries (PSC)42 using Macau43 as a linkage platform owing to 
its long history in bridging Sino and Lusophone worlds. As with FOCAC, China’s contemporary 
interest in the Lusophone world goes much beyond historical ties, being tied mainly in the 
economic opportunities, but also political interests (namely the establishment of diplomatic ties 
with Sao Tome & Principe). The PSC markets combined hold a population of 260 million (2014), 
spread across four continents. Four of these countries sit on massive mineral reserves (Brazil, 
                                               
38 Personal communication with senior South African diplomat, Pretoria, February 2016. 
39Ambassador Zhong Jianhua, remarks at South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) 
event, September 2010, Johannesburg. CATTF conferences, 2011, 2012, 2015. The call for 
improving joint knowledge production and construction of shared Sino-African values is made 
again at the CATTF II in Addis Ababa in 2012. See Mulugeta Gebrehiwot and Liu Hongwu, eds., 
China-Africa Relations: governance, peace and security (Addis Ababa: IPSS/ZNU 2013), p. 252. 
40 Discussions at FOCAC Academic Forum meetings, October 2012, Addis Ababa and October 
2013, Beijing. 
41 According to observations of the Forums in which the authors have participated (CATTF October 
2011 in Hangzhou; CAPF July 2012 in Suzhou; CATTF October 2012 in Addis Ababa). For a 
flavor of the public form of debates at CATTF in Addis Ababa, see an edited video clip of closing 
remarks 13 October 2012, accessed May 18, 2016, www.youtube.com/watch?v=7NSd9oRiqEw.  
42 Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Timor Leste, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Portugal. Sao Tome 
and Principe is not included in this Forum due to the fact that it has diplomatic relations with ROC. 
43 Macau was under Portuguese rule from 1513 until 1999, when it was handed over to China, 
becoming a Special Administrative Region under Chinese sovereignty. 
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Angola, Mozambique and East Timor), while Portugal represent an important entry point to the EU, 
China’s largest trade partner.  
 
The initiative to create this Sino-Lusophone Forum emerged from discussions between the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Executive Government of Macau SAR not long after 
Macau’s handover. 44  The intention to realise this endeavour was formalised during an official visit 
to Lisbon by China’s Vice Premier for Economic Affairs in July 2002 and the Forum was formally 
established in October 2003.45 The Macau Forum is to some extent a smaller replica of FOCAC in 
regards to its aims (promotion of trade and economic co-operation) and institutional process (inter-
ministerial meetings every three years and three-year action plans covering basically the same co-
operation areas). Unlike FOCAC, Macau Forum is under MOFCOM and has a permanent 
secretariat based in Macau which integrates permanent delegates from all PSC.  
 
The Permanent Secretariat (PS) is responsible for executing and monitoring the decisions of the 
ministerial meetings (including the action plan), do all the preparatory work for these meetings, 
draw an annual plan of activities and ensure the logistics, finances and administration to undertake 
these are in place. 46  Although the PS was officially established in April 2004 (following the 
approval of the first PS’ internal statutory rules), it took another three years before the PS was given 
dedicated facilities in Macau to fully undertake its mandate.  The PS runs in mandates of three years 
and is currently composed by the Secretary General (SG), three adjunct SGs, three offices 
(executive, liaison and support) and seven delegates, one from each of the represented Portuguese 
speaking countries. The Chinese government nominates the SG (normally with extensive 
experience in PSC), one of the adjunct SG and the coordinator of the executive office, all from 
MOFCOM. The Macau executive nominates one of the adjunct SG and the coordinator of the 
support office, usually staffed by Macau’s Secretariat for Economy and Finance; the Portuguese 
speaking countries nominate the other deputy SG and the coordinator of the liaison office staffed by 
the delegates (nominated by their respective countries).47   
While the Executive Office (staffed by MOFCOM cadres) runs the daily administration and is 
responsible for the PS contacts with the authorities and business sector in China; the Support Office 
(staffed by Macau’s Executive cadres) provides administrative, logistical and financial support to 
the PS; and the Liaison Office (staffed by the PSC members) is responsible for the interface with 
and between the Portuguese-speaking member states. Part of the Forum procedures are also 
ordinary (once a year) and extraordinary meetings (ad hoc) of the PS which include the PSC 
Ambassadors in Beijing and the Focal points – PSC liaison cadres located in their respective 
countries, in most cases based in the ministries of foreign affairs or commerce.   
                                               
44 The idea was publicly vented Macau SAR Chief Executive Edmund Ho during his first term in 
office (Ambrose So, ‘Geocapital – constituir uma plataforma operativa para a cooperação 
económica e comercial entre a China e os países de língua Portuguesa’[Geocapital – building na 
operational platform for economic and trade cooperation between China and the Portuguese 
Speaking Countries}, in Secretariado Permanente do Forum Macau (ed.) Textos do Seminário sobre 
o Desenvolvimento do Fórum para a Cooperação Económica e Comercial entre a China e os 
Países de Língua Portuguesa [Proceedings from the Seminar on the Development of the Forum for 
Economic and Trade Cooperation between Chna and the Portuguese Speaking Countries] , 
(Secretariado Permanente do FCECCPLP: Macau 2005), p. 103. 
45 Interview, former Portuguese Ambassador to China, London, 18 June 2007. 
47 Information in this paragraph according to Operational Statute of the Permanent Secretariat of 
Macau Forum, Approved November 2013 (articles 6 to 15) – courtesy of former delegate from 
Cape Verde. 
47 Information in this paragraph according to Operational Statute of the Permanent Secretariat of 
Macau Forum, Approved November 2013 (articles 6 to 15) – courtesy of former delegate from 
Cape Verde. 
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As of now four inter-ministerial meetings have taken place (2003, 2006, 2010 and 2013). According 
to the four action plans, the forum has seen the areas of cooperation expand from seven to fourteen 
since its inception. The original areas mentioned in the first action plan included intergovernmental 
cooperation, and cooperation in the fields of trade, investment and business, agriculture and 
fisheries, infrastructure, natural resources, human resources. The following inter-ministerial 
meetings added cooperation in the areas of development, tourism, transport and communications, 
financial, sports, culture, radio, TV and cinema, health and urban planning.   
The enduring relevance of the Forum for its members is reflected in the consistent pattern of high 
ranking representatives that attended the meetings from both sides, namely Premier and Vice 
premier levels on the Chinese end which have been reciprocated by Prime Ministers and Presidents 
on the Lusophone end.  Most significantly was the establishment of a US$1bn development 
cooperation fund in June 2013 to finance joint projects in PSC in the areas of infrastructure, 
transport, communications, energy, agriculture and natural resources. The fund, which had been 
under discussion since 2006, was officially announced by Wen Jiabao at the third summit in 2010 
and is jointly financed by CDB and the Macau government.  
Beyond the inter-ministerial meetings and the Action plans, the PS daily activities include, among 
other things,  the promotion of high level exchanges; organisation of workshops on transportation, 
media, health, culture, education, technology; organisation of regular business trade shows;  the 
Lusophone cultural week in Macau (once a year); human resources training workshops, as well as 
advertising the Forum. The bulk of the annual budget is spent in human resources’ development.48 
According to current practices, activities that take place in mainland China (be it training courses or 
formal meetings of the PS) are funded by MOFCOM, while the Macau government funds all the 
remaining budget needs of the PS through Macau’s Secretariat for Economy and Finance, 49 to 
which the support office reports.    
Even though its formal structure may give the Forum a multilateral appearance, the procedures at 
the operational level uncover a different dynamic, marked by a balance skewed in China’s favour. 
This reality stems from the fact that Beijing retains the policy initiative and provides the bulk of the 
funding (MOFCOM and the Macau Executive).  But this does not come without contestation as 
internal statutory rules have been revised a number of times since 2004, mostly due to the manifest 
discontent on the Lusophone end regarding China’s upper hand in the structure and institutional 
procedures of the Forum. When the first PS’s statutory rules were being discussed in 2004, the 
blueprint put forward by the Chinese authorities established that the SG was to be Chinese, which 
was immediately questioned by the PSC. After tough negotiations, eventually the PSC managed to 
get the text changed into a more flexible wording: ‘the first Secretary General will be Chinese’. 50  
The SG issue came up again in 2008 when the PS statutes were being revised and so the wording 
was changed to: ‘the next’ Secretary General will be nominated by China ‘after consultations with 
the other members’. 51  Although PSC are aware that there is only a slim chance that a non-Chinese 
will ever become SG of the Macau Forum, they insisted in leaving an open window. During this 
revision of the statutory rules, the PSC also tried (unsuccessfully) to enforce a two-third majority in 
decision making as opposed to consensus ruling proposed by the Chinese side (meaning China’s 
standing cannot be over-ruled).52 This battle seems to have been won by the Chinese side for now as 
according to the new operational statute of the Forum (2013) the SG is to be nominated by 
MOFCOM (although it does not specify that it has to be Chinese) and all decision making has to be 
reached by consensus. 
 
                                               
48 Information according to interviews conducted in the PS in Macau in October 2007. 
49 Interview, assistant to the Secretary General of Macau Forum, October 10, 2007  
50 Interview, former Portuguese Ambassador to China, London, June 18, 2007. 
51 According to article 4 (functions of the PS) of the PS statutory rules approved in March 2008 
52 Various interviews, Macau Forum, PSC delegates, October 2007 and September 2009, Macau 
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One other major issue of contention between the PSC delegates and the Chinese counterpart is that 
the Secretariat lacked a legal statute necessary to clarify its institutional order in Macau and 
internationally.53 Throughout most of its existence, the PS was formally a mere cooperation 
mechanism placed under the Macau/Chinese government (and not an international institution), 
raising delicate diplomatic issues for PSC delegates. The PSC delegates wished to have diplomatic 
statute for all members to facilitate their mobility and also to dignify the Forum internationally. To 
some extent this would even out China’s weight in the Forum. The clarification of the legal statute 
was constantly postponed by the Chinese side since the creation of the PS. It was finally approved 
in November 2013, and in this case partial concessions made to delegates. Although the new statute 
does not attribute diplomatic statute to the members of the secretariat, it grants them a special 
identification document that facilitates their mobility within all the member states.  
 
The debate around the statutory rules of the PS and its legal status in Macau since its creation in 
2004 illustrate well the tensions stemming from diverse expectations between PSC and China 
regarding the conceptualisation, structure and modus operandi of the Forum.  The formal 
integration of permanent PSC delegates in the secretariat introduced the seeds of a potential 
counterweight. The PSC have been steadily pushing for changes from within in an attempt to make 
the Forum more responsive to their respective countries’ expectations and interests and have 
managed to extract some concessions from China over the years.  
 
According to interviews conducted in Macau with all delegates and at the PSC embassies in 
Beijing,54 the biggest limitation of the Macau forum seems to be that the working methodology is 
too centralized and the Secretariat’s activities are too focused in short term training courses for 
public officials in Macau or in China. In the PSCs’ perspective it would be more useful and 
cheaper, to send Chinese technicians to each country to administrate longer training programmes, 
which would capacitate a larger number of attendants. The small budget of the Permanent 
Secretariat is another limitation pointed out by the Portuguese-speaking members, which combined 
with a rigid financial plan, does not leave much margin to add extra activities to the annual 
programme that remains largely determined by the Chinese side. Furthermore, and while China 
does not object to the extra activities proposed by PSC delegates it holds financial veto as China 
made clear from the beginning that it was only willing to pay for the activities that take place within 
its boundaries (China and Macau). Every activity to be held out of China under the umbrella of the 
Forum was to be funded by the respective country, and in general they lack the funds.  This stance, 
however, seems to be changing in recent years, as the latest Action Plan (2014-2016) mentions the 
possibility of Human resources training taking place in PSC with Chinese funds,55 a clear 
concession to rising PSC pressure on this specific point.  
                                               
53 Ivo Carneiro de Sousa, “Institucionalizacao: por um estatuto legal do secretariado Permanente do 
Forum Macau” [Institutionalisation: for a legal statute of Macau Forum Permanent Secretariat], 
Lusofonias 4, Jornal Tribuna de Macau, July 8, 2013, p. 4. 
54 Interviews in Macau (delegates of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique) 
conducted in October 24 and 25, 2007 and in Beijing between November 9 and December 13 
(Ambassadors of Angola, East Timor, Mozambique and Portugal; Economic counsellors of Cape 
Verde and Guinea Bissau and the Cultural Counsellor of Brazil – at the time the second Adjunct 
secretary general) 
55 Forum Macau, Plano de Accao para a Cooperacao Economica e Commercial da 4a conferencia 
Ministerial do  Forumpara a Cooperacao Economica e Comercial entre a China e os Paises de 
lingua Portuguesa (2014-2016) [Strategic Plan for Economic and Trade Co-operation of the 4th 
Ministerial Conference of the Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and 
Portuguese-speaking Countries (2014-2016)], November 2013 (points 7.3 and 7.4), accessed March 
15, 2015, http://www.forumchinaplp.org.mo/action-plans/?lang=pt  
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Like FOCAC, Macau Forum seems to remain very dependent on Chinese funds and agenda. 
However the creation of a permanent secretariat with permanent delegates (unlike FOCAC) has 
raised expectations in the Portuguese-speaking members, the African ones in particular, regarding 
their place in this dialogue platform. The evident discomfort with China’s dominant role suggests 
that these countries are not willing to be just at the receiving end but rather aspire to make their own 
inputs into the practices, policies and underlying norms of the forum.  
 
Regional Forums – constructing the ‘Sinosphere’ or socialisation from below? 
 
Recognising the limitations of deriving general principles from only a few cases studies, 
nonetheless this examination of FOCAC and the Macau Forum (coupled to a cursory reading of 
other developing country forums) is suggestive of some commonalities in China’s approach to 
regional forums it has with other developing countries.  These shared features include: the 
promotion of norms on sovereignty, ‘political equality’ and ‘mutual benefit’; seeking recognition 
for Chinese identity as a leading developing country; and the role of the secretariat as a (realised 
and potential) fulcrum for negotiating the terms of relations between China and region forum 
members.   
 
Our assessment of the two Chinese-instigated regional forums examined here, namely their 
evolving structure, suggests that China’s ability to ensure its interests is influenced over time by its 
capacity to maintain effective control over the administrative and financial structures.  As a result, 
when other developing countries seek greater parity in decision making over regional forum – 
drawing implicitly from accepted norms of sovereign equality of states which underpin the legal 
framework of most multilateral organisations – they encounter resistance from China.  The ensuing  
challenges to the status quo within regional forum invariably take the form of struggles over the 
structuring of key administrative organs and the accompanying decision making process and as 
such are reflective of different norms, interests and expectations held by developing country 
members. Chinese reactions to these challenges by forum members’ in the cases described above, 
shift between strategies of obstruction and accommodation. Understanding this process provides 
important insights into the viability of China’s professed role as a global leader and normative 
power within the developing world intent on fostering a more equitable international order 
commensurate with its own interests.   
 
The Macau Forum is in fact a paradigmatic case in the sense that it reveals a different kind of 
socialisation of China than commonly described in the scholarly literature. China’s regional forum 
diplomacy has brought into being its own form of ‘multilateralism’ with a distinctive set of rules (in 
both FOCAC and the Macau Forum), with the main purpose of generating good will and prestige 
for Beijing, despite the fact that the overwhelming content of relations in its economic and 
diplomatic forms still flow through bilateral channels. Nevertheless, in the case of Macau Forum, 
the formal structure of a Permanent Secretariat is slowly but surely gaining a multilateral dynamic 
that is seemingly eroding the rules of conduct preferred and promoted by China as demonstrated by 
the changing dynamics of the Macau Forum secretariat since its creation.  The same process is at 
work in the evolution of FOCAC. The grudging acceptance of longstanding Africans demands to 
give the AU formal recognition within the FOCAC process remains for now, however, constrained 
by Beijing’s continued resistance to creating a permanent secretariat with shared authority over 
FOCAC. Retaining control of the agenda and financing of regional forum activities becomes 
effectively a defensive posture by Beijing to limit potential damage to their image and interests. 
This is yet another sign that regional forums are not automatically repositories for China’s preferred 
values and interests, but subject to a modification through non-Chinese member state pressures.   
 
In this respect it can be said that China is not only experiencing socialisation into the international 
community through established, Western-dominated international organisations, but, to a certain 
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degree, Beijing is also experiencing pressure to socialise by its own regional forums initiatives, 
where it is subject to the inputs of its developing country counterparts. Thus Chinese foreign policy 
becomes more attuned to, for instance, the African countries recognised acceptance of external 
intervention in the area of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa, codified in the AU 
Constitutive Act and operationalised since 2002, and has to adjust its rhetoric and even practices to 
accommodate existing African policies at the expense of its long standing non-interference 
principle.56 The extent of this impact on Chinese foreign policy positions is, however, dependent on 
the degree of assertiveness and coordination of China’s counterparts. Beijing’s hesitance over 
formalisation of institutional arrangements, which would almost inevitably empower members by 
aligning their standing within regional forums more closely with the principle of sovereign equality 
of states, is a reflection of concerns that such a development would undermine its relative power in 
these asymmetric relationships.   
 
At the same time, the longer term Chinese ambition of promoting shared values through these 
developing country regional forums can be understood as an effort to facilitate better cooperation on 
foreign policy matters. While the absence of institutional rules derived from Western sources was 
expected to facilitate the grounding of common norms in these regional forums that cohered more 
closely with Chinese interests, in fact there has been only limited evidence of this phenomenon 
occurring so far. In fact, developing countries participated in the negotiation of the terms of regional 
forums and sought to use them to access Chinese resources. These non-Chinese states have, for the 
time being, been satisfied with the loose arrangements characteristic of regional forum diplomacy 
but as the cases expounded here suggest, the pressure to expand will bring with them a greater 
potential for tension over their institutional shape and management, especially with respect to 
resources. It can be argued that China’s relationships with regional forums provides a window on a 
– for lack of a better phrase – ‘Sino-centric’ form of multilateralism in the making. Whether this is, 
following from the recent scholarly debates on China as a civilizational power, a manifestation of a 
contemporary or nascent form of ‘tianxia’ system seems pre-mature and more speculative at this 
stage.57 The assertion, however, that the gap between the ‘grand design’ of Pax Sinica as imagined 
in the imperial court and its historically contingent institutional and operational forms does appear 
to find an echo in the contemporary disjuncture between Beijing’s presentation of regional forums 
and their actual features.   
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